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COPYRIGHTS AND THE NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY
ACT: IS THE COPYRIGHT INFRINGER A THIEF?
INTRODUCTION
Criminal copyright infringement' has become one of the most per-
vasive problems in the area of white-collar crime.2 In response to the
concern that the criminal penalties provided by the Copyright Revi-
sion Act of 1976 (1976 Act)3 were too lenient to curb the proliferation
of copyright infringement, 4 Congress recently strengthened the laws
against such infringement by passing the Piracy and Counterfeiting
Amendments Act of 1982 (PCAA).5 Despite the stiff penalties em-
bodied in these amendments, 6 some prosecutors and courts are not
content to rely on criminal copyright laws as the sole statutory means
of combatting piracy. Consequently, copyright infringers have been
convicted of violating not only the criminal copyright laws, but also
1. Criminal copyright infringement is defined as any willful infringement of a
copyright "for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain." 17
U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982). Such infringement is a form of piracy, which is the unauthor-
ized copying of any original commercial product. S. Rep. No. 274, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Senate Report], reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 127, 129. The sound recording and motion picture industries are
those most damaged by this form of piracy. See id. at 3-4, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 129-30; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (1982) (harshest
penalties for infringements involving "sound recordings" and films or "other audiovi-
sual works").
2. 1981 Senate Report, supra note 1, at 3-4, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 129-30.
3. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§101-810 (1982))
4. 1981 Senate Report, supra note 1, at 6-7, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 132-33.
5. Pub. L. No. 97-180, §§ 2-3, 96 Stat. 91 (1982) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2318-
2319 (1982)).
6. The amendments prescribe a maximum prison term of five years or a fine not
to exceed $250,000, or both, for infringements involving the reproduction or distribu-
tion, within a 180-day period, of at least 1,000 illegal copies of a copyrighted sound
recording or at least 65 illegal copies of a copyrighted audiovisual work. 18 U.S.C. §
2319(b)(1)(A), (B) (1982). An infringement involving the reproduction or distribu-
tion, within a 180-day period, of either 101 to 999 illegal copies of a copyrighted
sound recording or 8 to 64 copies of a copyrighted audiovisual work is punishable by
a $250,000 fine or two years in prison, or both. Id. § 2319(b)(2). A second or
subsequent such offense carries the maximum penalty of five years imprisonment and
a $250,000 fine. Id. § 2319(b)(1)(C). All other criminal copyright infringements are
punishable by a $25,000 fine or one year in prison or both. Id. § 2319(b)(3).
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the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA),7 which prohibits interstate
transportation of certain stolen goods.8
To determine whether the NSPA covers copyright infringement,
this Note looks first to the language of the NSPA. Part I discusses
whether the NSPA covers theft of intangibles, whether statutory copy-
right comports with traditional notions of property ownership, and
whether strict rules of construction should be used to interpret the
language of the NSPA. The Note then explores the interplay between
the NSPA and the criminal copyright laws, particularly the PCAA, to
determine whether the NSPA was intended to encompass copyright
infringement. The Note concludes that the NSPA should not be used
to combat copyright infringement.
I. THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE NSPA
A. The NSPA's Application to Intangibles
The NSPA prohibits interstate transportation of "goods, wares or
merchandise" worth $5,000 or more and known to be "stolen, con-
verted or taken by fraud."'9 Whether the statute prohibits interstate
transportation of pirated copies of copyrighted material depends on
whether copyright infringement constitutes theft or conversion of
goods, wares or merchandise.10
The first step in analyzing whether copyright infringement consti-
tutes theft of goods is to identify what is taken when a copyright is
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Gottesman, No. 81-5663,
slip op. at 1639 (11th Cir. Feb. 16, 1984); United States v. Belmont, 715 F.2d 459,
461-62 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1275 (1984), petition for cert. filed
sub nom. Hampshire v. United States, 52 U.S.L.W. 3704 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1984) (No.
83-1445); United States v. Gallant, 570 F. Supp. 303, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). But see
United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 249 (5th Cir. 1982) (NSPA inapplicable to
copyright infringement). The NSPA was applied to copyright infringement prior to
the passage of the PCAA in 1982. See, e.g., United States v. Berkwitt, 619 F.2d 649,
656 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Whetzel, 589 F.2d 707, 710 n.10 (D.C. Cir.
1978); United States v. Atherton, 561 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1332 (9th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and
remanded on other grounds, 572 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 436 U.S. 904
(1978).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982).
9. Id.
10. See United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 238-39 (5th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1332 (9th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and
remanded on other grounds, 572 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904
(1978); United States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 380, 385 (E.D.N.Y.), motion
for new trial granted, 518 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dismissed, 675
F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1982).
1243
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
infringed." Several courts have identified the copyright itself as the
object of the infringer's alleged theft. 12 This analysis, however, fails to
recognize that though infringement damages the infringed right, it
does not transfer the right to the infringer. 13 A criminal that transports
pirated works does not transport the "right to produce legitimate
[works] ." 14 Therefore, whether copyrights themselves are "goods,
wares or merchandise" is immaterial to the NSPA's applicability to
copyright infringement.
Alternatively, the infringing copies of the copyrighted material may
be considered stolen goods under the NSPA. ' The NSPA is clearly
violated when the tangible items transported interstate have been
illegally removed from their owner's possession. For example, such a
violation occurs when an infringer illegally duplicates copyrighted
material onto the copyright owner's paper, film or other material and
then transports the illegal copies across state lines.' 6 Defining the
copies as stolen goods is problematic, however, when the infringer
11. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 239 (5th. Cir. 1982) (analysis
begins by assuming that copyrights are stolen "goods"); United States v. Gallant, 570
F. Supp. 303, 310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (analysis begins by comparing defendant's and
Government's arguments regarding what, if any, "goods" were stolen); United States
v. Sam Goody, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 380, 387 (E.D.N.Y.) (first inquiry is "whether the
aggregation of sounds taken in violation of the copyright laws" constitutes stolen
goods), motion for new trial granted, 518 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal
dismissed, 675 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1982).
12. See United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 239-41 (5th. Cir. 1982); United
States v. Atherton, 561 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Gallant, 570
F. Supp. 303, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); cf. King Bros. Prods. v. RKO Teleradio Pictures,
Inc., 208 F. Supp. 271, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (considering whether "literary prop-
erty," a form of copyright, has been converted); Italiani v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Corp., 45 Cal. App. 2d 464, 466, 114 P.2d 370, 372 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941)
(same).
13. Pickford Corp. v. De Luxe Labs., Inc., 169 F. Supp. 118, 120 (S.D. Cal.
1958); 2 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8.23, at 8-272.9 n.1 (1983).
14. United States v. Whetzel, 589 F.2d 707, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
15. See United States v. Belmont, 715 F.2d 459, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1275 (1984), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Hampshire v. United
States, 52 U.S.L.W. 3704 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1984) (No. 83-1445); United States v.
Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1332 (9th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and
remanded on other grounds, 572 F.2d 215 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904
(1978); United States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 380, 385-86 (E.D.N.Y.),
motion for new trial granted, 518 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dismissed,
675 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1982).
16. See United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 393 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966); United States v. Lester, 282 F.2d 750, 752, 755 (3d Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 937 (1961); United States v. Seagraves, 265 F.2d 876,
878-80 (3d Cir. 1959).
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copies onto his own materials. 17 If anything is stolen in such a case, it
is only the intangible subject matter of the copyright rather than the
tangible copy.18
The term "goods, wares or merchandise," however, has rarely been
defined to include purely intangible matter.' 9 Consequently, some
courts, while acknowledging that the infringer has taken only intangi-
ble matter, have relied on the tangible nature of the transported copy
to find the infringer liable under the NSPA.20 For example, one court
ruled that "the intangible idea protected by the copyright is effectively
made tangible by its embodiment upon the tapes and therefore consti-
tutes 'goods, wares, or merchandise' within the meaning of [the
NSPA] "121
Judicial reluctance to define intangibles as "goods, wares or mer-
chandise" is troublesome. To bring the defendant within the ambit of
the NSPA, courts may identify the tangible component of the infring-
ing copy as "stolen. '2 2 Yet, in determining whether the NSPA's $5,000
valuation requirement is met, courts are forced to acknowledge that
17. This situation, in which the infringer legitimately obtains the tangible com-
ponents of his infringing copies, is the typical factual setting of a case involving the
NSPA's application to copyright infringement. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 686
F.2d 234, 243 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Berkwitt, 619 F.2d 649, 658 (7th Cir.
1980); United States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 506 F..Supp. 380, 388 (E.D.N.Y.), motion
for new trial granted, 518 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dismissed, 675
F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1982).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Gottesman, No. 81-5663, slip op. at 1639 (11th
Cir. Feb. 16, 1984) (stolen goods consist of stolen intangible property affixed to
legitimately obtained tangible property); United States v. Berkwitt, 619 F.2d 649,
658 (7th Cir. 1980) (jury instructed that what was stolen was the "fixation of
recorded sounds," not the tangible tape parts); United States v. Whetzel, 589 F.2d
707, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (defendants stole the "aggregation of sounds").
19. See, e.g., United States v. Gottesman, No. 81-5663, slip op. at 1638 (11th
Cir. Feb. 16, 1984); United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974
(1966).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Gottesman, No. 81-5663, slip op. at 1635, 1638
(11th Cir. Feb. 16, 1984) (intangible idea protected by copyright made tangible by
embodiment on tapes); United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 393 (2d Cir.) (a court
would be "hard pressed" to find that "goods" had been stolen when nothing tangible
was taken or transported), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966); United States v. Sam
Goody, Inc. 506 F. Supp. 380, 388 (E.D.N.Y.) (a stolen intangible component and a
lawfully obtained tangible component together constitute a stolen item), motion for
new trial granted, 518 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dismissed, 675 F.2d
17 (2d Cir. 1982).
21. United States v. Gottesman, No. 81-5663., slip op. at 1638 (11th Cir. Feb.
16, 1984).
22. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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the same tangible component is not "stolen. ' 23 Furthermore, requir-
ing the existence of a tangible copy to find a violation of the NSPA
precludes use of the statute to convict an infringer who memorizes
legally-protected information and then waits until after he crosses a
state line to write it down. 24 The same infringer would be liable under
the NSPA if he wrote the information down just before he crossed the
state boundary.2 5 Therefore, reluctance to define intangibles as
"goods, wares or merchandise" under the NSPA engenders inconsis-
tent reasoning and disparate results.
These problems can be avoided simply by finding that intangibles
can be "goods, wares or merchandise" under the NSPA.2 6 The com-
monly-accepted judicial interpretation of the NSPA's "goods, wares or
merchandise" is "a general and comprehensive designation of such
personal property or chattels as are ordinarily a subject of com-
merce."2 7 Property is normally defined to include intangibles,28 and
23. See United States v. Gottesman, No. 81-5663, slip op. at 1639 (11th Cir. Feb.
16, 1984); United States v. Belmont, 715 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1275 (1984), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Hampshire v. United States,
52 U.S.L.W. 3704 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1984) (No. 83-1445); United States v. Berkwitt,
619 F.2d 649, 656-58 (7th Cir. 1980).
24. United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
974 (1966); M. Epstein, Modern Intellectual Property 59 (unpublished manuscript
1983) (available in the files of Fordham Law Review); see United States v. Smith,
686 F.2d 234, 241 n.10 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Bottone, 365 F.2d at 393); United
States v. Gallant, 570 F. Supp. 303, 312 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same).
25. United States v. Gallant, 570 F. Supp. 303, 312 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); M.
Epstein, supra note 24, at 59-60.
26. An American Bar Association Subcommittee has recommended that Congress
amend the NSPA to cover theft of trade secrets regardless of whether the tangible
item embodying the trade secret is taken. Subcommittee B, A.B.A. Section of Patent,
Trademark and Copyright Law, Establishment of Federal Criminal Statute on Inter-
state Transportation of Misappropriated Trade Secrets, 1971 Comm. Reps. 217, 219.
Some states prohibit theft of a trade secret only if it is embodied in a tangible form;
other states cover theft of a trade secret even if it is in a purely intangible form.
Compare N.Y. Penal Law § 165.07 (McKinney 1975) (requiring making of a "tangi-
ble reproduction or representation" to constitute unlawful use of a trade secret) with
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 637:2, :3 (1974), (requiring only "unauthorized control" to
constitute theft of a trade secret and therefore covering theft of purely intangible
matter).
27. United States v. Seagraves, 265 F.2d 876, 880 (3d Cir. 1959); see United
States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 240-41 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Seagraves, 265 F.2d at
880); United States v. Greenwald, 479 F.2d 320, 322 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 854 (1973) (same); United States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 380, 388
(E.D.N.Y.) (same), motion for new trial granted, 518 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y.
1981), appeal dismissed, 675 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1982).
28. Computing Scale Co. v. Toledo Computing Scale Co., 279 F. 648, 671 (7th
Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 657 (1922); Black's Law Dictionary 1095 (5th ed.
1979); R. Brown, The Law of Personal Property § 1.7, at 11 (3d ed. 1975); see
1246 [Vol. 52
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intangibles may be ordinary subjects of commerce.2 9 Therefore,
whether an item is tangible should not dictate whether it constitutes
"goods, wares or merchandise" under the NSPA. 30
The NSPA's application to intangible matter, however, is not deter-
mined solely by the meaning of "goods, wares or merchandise."' The
statute applies only to property that can be "stolen, converted or taken
by fraud. 3 2 Those terms, in the context of the NSPA, denote all forms
of wrongful taking that are aimed at depriving an owner of the rights
and benefits of property ownership.3 3 Therefore, assuming it is the
subject of ownership, and is capable of being taken from its owner, an
intangible may be stolen or converted within the meaning of the
NSPA.
B. Copyrights Distinguished From Ownership of Copyrighted
Material
The NSPA protects the rights associated with property ownership.3 4
Consequently, whether copyright infringement is covered by the
Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338, 340 (E.D.N.C. 1939); cf. Jones v. Corbyn, 186
F.2d 450, 452 (10th Cir. 1950) (defining property within tax laws).
29. United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1982) (item such as a
copyright may be commonly bought and sold); In re Vericker, 446 F.2d 244, 248 (2d
Cir. 1971) (secret manufacturing procedures are ordinary subjects of sale); Painton &
Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 223 (2d Cir. 1971) (recognizing validity of
licensing agreements involving trade secrets); 12 R. Milgrim, Business Organizations:
Trade Secrets § 1.06, at 1-27 (1983) (trade secrets considered licensed property).
30. See United States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 380, 388 (E.D.N.Y.)
("Judicial construction of [the NSPA] has consistently focused primarily on the com-
mercial nature of the items involved, with consideration of the tangible or intangible
nature of the items a secondary concern."), motion for new trial granted, 518 F.
Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dismissed, 675 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1982).
31. Several courts, in addition to investigating whether the statutory phrase
"goods, wares or merchandise" precludes the NSPA's application to intangible, intel-
lectual material, have conducted separate investigations into whether the phrase
"stolen, converted or taken by fraud" bars such application. See, e.g., United States
v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 242 (5th Cir. 1982) (only tangibles can be "stolen, converted
or taken by fraud," therefore the NSPA does not cover copyright infringement);
United States v. Gallant, 570 F. Supp. 303, 312 & n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (intangibles
can be stolen); United States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 506 F.Supp. 380, 390-91
(E.D.N.Y.) ("stolen, converted or taken by fraud" covers all forms of wrongful
taking), motion for new trial granted, 518 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal
dismissed, 675 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1982).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982). See supra note 31.
33. See United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 995 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Handler, 142 F.2d 351, 353 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 741 (1944);
Crabb v. Zerbst, 99 F.2d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 1938); cf. United States v. Turley, 352
U.S. 407, 417 (1957) (In the context of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act,
"stolen" refers to "all felonious takings of motor vehicles with intent to deprive the
owner of the rights and benefits of ownership.").
34. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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NSPA depends on whether the owner of a copyright owns the co-
pyrighted work.3 5 Central to the concept of ownership is the right to
exclude others from that which is owned.36 This right of exclusion is so
essential to ownership that the law generally does not recognize a
right of ownership in things such as light, air or wild animals, which
are not amenable to exclusive control.37 The underlying principles and
functional characteristics of statutory copyright indicate that it does
not provide the copyright owner with the kind of exclusive control
over the copyrighted material that undergirds property ownership.
Copyright protection has historically been provided by both state
and federal law.38 State copyright law is generally referred to as
"common-law" copyright; federal copyright law is generally de-
scribed as statutory copyright. 39 Traditionally, common-law copy-
right protected unpublished works while statutory copyright pro-
tected published works. 40 Although the Copyright Revision Act of
1976 has virtually pre-empted common-law copyright, 41 a comparison
35. One court that applied the NSPA to copyright infringement distinguished
ownership rights from the rights afforded by a copyright. Nonetheless, the court
stated that both types are equally worthy of protection. See United States v. Belmont,
715 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The rights of copyright owners in their protected
property are just as deserving of protection... as are the ownership interests of those
who own other types of property."), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1275 (1984).
36. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918)(Brandeis, J., dissenting); United States v. Lutz, 295 F.2d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 1961);
Washington Medical Center, Inc. v. United States, 545 F.2d 116, 125 (Ct. Cl. 1976)(quoting 73 C.J.S. Property § 1, at 148 (1951)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977);
Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 731, 299 P.2d 257, 265 (1956) (en bane); Millar v.
Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 233 (K.B. 1769); R. Brown, supra note 28, § 1.6, at 8;
Bhalla, Legal Analysis of the Right of Property, 10 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 180, 183-84
(1981).
37. R. Brown, supra note 28, § 1.6, at 8; see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
434 (wild birds not owned by anyone because not possessed by anyone); International
News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(air is free for common use).
38. S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975
Senate Report]; N. Boorstyn, Copyright Law § 1:1, at 2 (1981); 1 M. Nimmer, supra
note 13, § 1.01[A], at 1-3 (1983).
39. N. Boorstyn, supra note 38, § 1:3, at 4; 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 13, §
1.01[B], at 1-8.
40. 1975 Senate Report, supra note 38, at 112; N. Boorstyn, supra note 38, § 1:1,
at 2; 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 13, § 1.01[A], at 1-3. The states have concurrent
power to enact copyright laws that do not conflict with federal legislation. N.
Boorstyn, supra note 38, § 1:3, at 4; see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571
(1973); 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 13, § 1.01[A], at 1-6.
41. In 1978, the effective date of the 1976 Act, common-law copyright protection
of unpublished works was pre-empted by statutory copyright. Copyright Revision
1248 [Vol. 52
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of common-law and statutory copyright is relevant because it indi-
cates that the latter is not a form of property ownership.
Common-law copyright is based on the principle that the author of
an intellectual work is entitled to the opportunity to profit from his
labor. 42 The author is deprived of this opportunity if others are al-
lowed to publicize the contents of his work before he publishes it. 43
Therefore, works protected by common-law copyright are recognized
as a form of personal property44 and cannot be published or used in
any manner without the owner's consent. 45 Common-law copyright
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2572 (1976) (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C § 301 (1982)); see 1975 Senate Report, supra note 38, at 114 ("The intention
of section 301 is to preempt and abolish any rights under the common law or statutes
of a State that are equivalent to copyright and that extend to works coming within
the scope of the Federal copyright law."); H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
129-33 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 House Report], reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 5659, 5745-49 (federal preemption of common-law copyright).
Works that are not embodied in a tangible medium, such as "choreography that has
never been filmed or notated, an extemporaneous speech, [or] 'original works of
authorship' communicated solely through conversations," are outside the scope of
federal copyright law and therefore, continue to be protected by common-law co-
pyright. 1975 Senate Report, supra note 38, at 114-15; see Estate of Hemingway v.
Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 349, 244 N.E.2d 250, 256, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771,
779 (1968) (common-law copyright might extend to certain kinds of spoken dialo-
gue).
42. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 498, 554, 8 Pet. 591, 657 (1834); Werckmeis-
ter v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321, 324-25 (2d Cir. 1904); Bevan v. CBS,
329 F. Supp. 601, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 13, § 2.02, at 2-22.
43. Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 232 (K.B. 1769); see Harper & Row, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Mere publicity concern-
ing the contents of an unpublished work, as opposed to publication of the work, can
diminish the financial return upon publication. Harper & Row, 557 F. Supp. at 1072
n.11. The author of an unpublished work, therefore, has a financial interest in
preventing not only the unauthorized copying of his work, but any unauthorized use
of the work that might prematurely publicize its contents. This financial interest may
partially explain why common-law copyright, which protects unpublished works,
prohibits any unauthorized use of the copyrighted work, see infra note 45 and
accompanying text, while statutory copyright, which has historically protected
published works, see supra note 40 and accompanying text, affords the copyright
owner narrower rights in regulating use of the copyrighted work. See infra notes 51-
57 and accompanying text.
44. Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 539 (1872) ("Until published, the work is
the private property of the author .. "); Jenkins v. News Syndicate Co., 128 Misc.
284, 285, 219 N.Y.S. 196, 198 (Sup. Ct. 1926) ("[L]iterary, dramatic and musical
creations among those which are recognized as property by the common law.");
Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 439, 194 A. 631, 634 (1937)
("At common law, rights in a literary or artistic work were recognized on substan-
tially the same basis as title to other property.").
45. American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299 (1907) ("[T]he
property of the author or painter in his intellectual creation is absolute until he
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protection is also based on the principle that an author has a right to
keep his works private.46 This protection, if not terminated by publi-
cation,47 is perpetual.
48
Trade secrets, like works protected by common-law copyright, are
widely accepted as a form of property. 49 For an idea to receive protec-
tion as a trade secret, its owner must take reasonable measures to
maintain its secrecy. 50 Thus, the rights of both trade secret and corn-
voluntarily parts with the same."); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 F. 15, 18 (2d
Cir. 1906) ("The property of an author in his intellectual work production is absolute
until he voluntarily parts with all or some of his rights.") (quoting E. Drone, The
Law of Property in Intellectual Productions 8, 102-03 (1879)), aff'd, 210 U.S. 339
(1908); McCarter v. Barton Music. Corp., 115 U.S.P.Q. 299, 299 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1957) (right to prevent publication or use of an unpublished musical composition
recognized at common law); Berry v. Hoffman, 125 Pa. Super. 261, 264-65, 189 A.
516, 518 (1937) ("The property rights in a literary production before publication are
exclusively in the author."). But see 2 M. Nimmer, supra note 13, § 8.23, at 8-273
(Though the rights afforded by common-law copyright are broader than those fur-
nished by statutory copyright, case law does not support the conclusion that the
former protects against all unauthorized uses of its subject matter.).
46. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348, 244
N.E.2d 250, 255, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 778 (1968); 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 13, §
1.10[B], at 1-70; see Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(author's freedom to speak or remain silent is an end in itself), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
948 (1982).
47. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 498, 554, 8 Pet. 591, 657-58 (1834); Hirshon v.
United Artists Corp., 243 F.2d 640, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1957); N. Boorstyn, supra note
38, 1:4, at 5; 2 M. Nimmer, supra note 13, § 9.01, at 9-2 n.1.
48. N. Boorstyn, supra note 38, § 1:4, at 4-5; see American Tobacco Co. v.
Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299 (1907); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 F. 15, 18
(2d Cir. 1906), aff'd, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); 1975 Senate Report, supra note 38, at 113.
49. See 12 R. Milgrim, supra note 29, § 1.0112], at 1-7; see, e.g., Scharmer v.
Carrollton Mfg. Co., 525 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1975); Underwater Storage, Inc. v.
United States Rubber Co., 371 F-2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 911 (1967); Formulabs, Inc- v. Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52, 56-57 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830 (1960); Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp.,
207 F.2d 912, 922 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954); Aktiebolaget
Bofors v. United States, 194 F.2d 145, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1951). But see E.I. DuPont
deNemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (trade secrets cannot
accurately be described as property); Northern Petrochem Co. v. Tomlinson, 484
F.2d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1973) (tort law, not property law, is the basis for a trade
secret misappropriation action). Many states have recently amended their criminal
laws to designate trade secrets as property that may be the subject of larceny. See,
e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-2201(6) & Commentary, 41-2207 (1977); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-4-408 (1973); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 637:2 (1974); see also M. Epstein, supra
note 24, at 62-64 (compilation of state criminal laws dealing with theft of trade
secrets).
50, Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co, 378 F. Supp. 806, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
see E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d. 1012, 1017 (5th Cir.
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mon-law copyright owners include the right to exclude others from
protected property. Therefore, both trade secrets and common-law
copyright comport with traditional notions of property ownership.
By contrast, statutory copyright, though it provides the copyright
owner with many exclusive rights regarding the use of the copyrighted
work,5' is not the equivalent of property ownership. Historically,
statutory copyright applied to published works .52 Because publication
affords the author an opportunity to profit from his labor, the need to
protect his work as personal property is less compelling after than
before publication. 53 Furthermore, after publication, the author's
rights to his work must accommodate the property rights acquired by
the purchasers of the published copies of the work.5 4 For example,
though an author's financial interests are injured when a purchaser
lends the purchased copy to friends, the author is unable to prevent
such lending. 5  Distinct from purchasers' property rights, the public
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971); Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v.
Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1117 (E.D. Mich. 1975);
12 R. Milgrim, supra note 29, § 2.04, at 2-26 to 2-29.
51. Statutory copyright provides the copyright owner with five fundamental,
exclusive rights concerning the copyrighted work: (1) right to reproduce the work, (2)
right to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work, (3) right to distri-
bute copies of the work, (4) right to publicly perform the work, and (5) right to
publicly display the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
52. See 1975 Senate Report, supra note 38, at 112; N. Boorstyn, supra note 38, §
1:3.
53. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 498, 554, 8 Pet. 591, 657 (1834) (argument
that a literary man is entitled to the product of his labor is answered by the fact that
he realizes that product upon his first publication); Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep.
201, 232 (K.B. 1769) (an author is not "totally robbed" of the profit of his labor by
the unauthorized publication of his published manuscript, as he is when his unpub-
lished manuscript is surreptitiously published). Whether one has received the oppor-
tunity to profit by his labor is an important consideration in determining whether the
law should recognize the product of that labor as his property. See Board of Trade v.
Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 251 (1905) ("[I]nformation will not
become public property until the plaintiff has gained its reward."); Associated Press
v. International News Serv., 245 F. 244, 250 (2d Cir. 1917) ("[H]ere it is reasonable
and just that . . . plaintiff ... should have a property right in its news until the
reasonable reward ... is received .. "), aff'd, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
54. The purchaser of a copy of a published work is not subject to an implied
contract with the author restricting the use of the work. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33
U.S. 498, 554, 8 Pet. 591, 657 (1834).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982). The legislative history of the 1976 Act suggests that
the Act was not aimed at, nor can it control, certain private uses of copyrighted
products. See Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearings on S. 646 and H.R.
6927 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of House Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23
(1971) (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights) (unable to
control home taping of broadcasted music); H.R. Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
7 (1971) (not aimed at home use).
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acquires a right to benefit from the free dissemination of the author's
ideas,5 6 which on publication are no longer protected by the author's
right to keep his thoughts private. 57 Thus, the author's right to exercise
exclusive control over his published work is outweighed by the pur-
chasers' property rights and the public's right to free dissemination of
ideas.
The constitutional provision that empowers Congress to enact copy-
right laws reflects the predominance of the public's rights over those of
the author.58 Both Congress 9 and the Supreme Court 0 have deter-
mined that the constitutional purpose underlying Congress' authority
to promulgate copyright statutes is not to reward authors. Instead, it
56. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 782 (1984);
Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Chafee,
Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 511 (1945); Gor-
man, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 Harv.
L. Rev. 1569, 1571 (1963); cf. Sidis v. F-R Publications Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d
Cir.) (public interest in obtaining information overrides the defendant's right to
privacy), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
57. See 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 13, § 4.03, at 4-15 to 4-16.
58. The Constitution empowers Congress to "[secure] . . . to Authors ... the
exclusive Right to their.. . . Writings." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The use of this
legislative power, however, must "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
Id. Therefore, Congress can furnish authors with exclusive rights only for "limited
Times." Id. The "promotion" clause of this provision is often cited in support of the
"fair use" limitation on copyright. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random House,
Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Berlin v.
E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964);
Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943); see also
Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 585, 595 (1956)
(doctrine has constitutional basis). The "limited times" limitation mandates that
statutory copyright "not enjoy a property status fully comparable to other forms of
personalty." 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 13, § 1.03[A], at 1-30.2 n.6. Congress cited
the "limited times" provision as an important factor in its decision to replace com-
mon-law copyright protection of unpublished works with federal statutory protec-
tion, 1975 Senate Report, supra note 38, at 113, the latter being a more limited right
than its common-law counterpart. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. There-
fore, it is apparent that these constitutional provisions undergird a statutory co-
pyright that furnishes the author with less than exclusive rights to his work.
59. See H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909) ("[C]opyright legisla-
tion by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural
right that the author has in his writings ... but upon the ground that the welfare of
the public will be served ... by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive
rights to their writings.") [hereinafter cited as 1909 House Report].
60. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 782 (1984);
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131,
158 (1948).
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is to provide an incentive for artistic endeavors that will promote the
public good."'
The nature of statutory copyright reflects its purpose. Although
common-law copyright is a traditional property right, federal copy-
right statutes create a more restricted right.6 2 This right has a fixed
duration and contains numerous limitations that are designed to bene-
fit the public.6 3 These limitations deprive the copyright owner of
exclusive control of the copyrighted material. 64 For example, broad-
casters cannot prevent copying of their copyrighted broadcasts for
61. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 782 (1984);
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1974); Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158
(1948); see 1909 House Report, supra note 59, at 7.
62. See H.R. Rep. No. 7083, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1907) ("The laws passed
under the Constitution do not extend the natural right, but limit it. Constitutional
provisions regarding copyrights and laws passed thereunder do not grant property
rights, but limit them."). A Senate Judiciary Committee report introducing the
provision in the 1976 Act that prescribes the preemption of common-law copyright
protection for unpublished works by statutory copyright states: "The preemption...
is complete.. . even though the scope of exclusive rights given the work under the
bill is narrower than the scope of common law rights in the work might have been."
1975 Senate Report, supra note 38, at 115. This report also states that, due to
preemption, "authors will be giving up [their] perpetual, unlimited exclusive com-
mon law rights." Id. at 118. The use of the word "unlimited" is significant. The word
does not refer to the unlimited duration of common-law protections which is con-
veyed by the word "perpetual." Instead, it draws a contrast between the statutory
copyright, which is explicitly subject to numerous "limitations," 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-12
(1982), see infra note 64 and accompanying text, and the common-law copyright,
which is not so limited, see supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1982) (in general, life of the author plus fifty years for works
created on or after January 1, 1978, the effective date of the 1976 Act).
64. See, e.g., id. § 107 (allowing the "fair use" of a copyrighted work for
purposes such as criticism, teaching or research); id. § 110 (allowing the performance
or display of a copyrighted work, for certain non-commercial purposes, by educa-
tional, governmental or religious institutions); id. § 111 (allowing, under certain
circumstances, the unlicensed retransmission of copyrighted broadcast signals and
providing a "compulsory licensing" system for the retransmission of copyrighted
broadcast signals by cable television companies); id. § 115 (providing a "compulsory
licensing" system whereby persons may obtain a license to make and distribute
phonorecords of nondramatic musical works that have been distributed to the
public).
The "fair use" doctrine is closely related to the constitutional aim of promoting the
public good through the advancement of arts and sciences. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text. The compulsory licensing of published musical works is intended
to avoid the monopolization of those works, Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody
Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392, 395-96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975);
see Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Remington Records, Inc., 265 F.2d 263, 269-70 (2d.
Cir. 1959); H.R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
1967 House Report], and thus provide the public with reasonably priced, high
quality records and tapes. See 1967 House Report, supra, at 66. The educational
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later viewing at home,65 authors cannot prevent the reproduction of
their copyrighted works for purposes of research or commentary, 66
and composers, once they have released a song to the public, cannot
prevent recording companies from obtaining a "compulsory license"
to produce that song.67 Thus, the copyright owner, while possessing a
valuable statutory right that resembles ownership of the copyrighted
work, does not possess the right of exclusion that distinguishes pro-
perty ownership from other interests. Statutorily-copyrighted mate-
rial, therefore, is not the personal property of the copyright owner.6 8
Consequently, the NSPA, which protects the rights associated with
property ownership, does not apply to copyright infringement.
C. Strict Construction of the NSPA
This interpretation of the NSPA, which restricts the statute's cov-
erage to crimes that violate the right of property ownership, is consis-
tent with the rule that criminal statutes should be narrowly construed
in favor of the criminal defendant.6 9 This rule is designed to prevent
courts from usurping the legislature's exclusive right to define, and
broadcasting limitation, defined in 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) (1982), which allows the
unauthorized performance or broadcasting of nondramatic literary or musical works
for certain educational purposes, is designed, inter alia, to provide adult eduation,
combat illiteracy and promote cultural interests. See 1967 House Report, supra, at
43.
65. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 796 (1984)
(Congress did not make it illegal for television viewers to record broadcasts for "time-
shifting" purposes).
66. See Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d
541, 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1362-63 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (1982).
68. Property, in this context, refers to things that are subject to the right of
ownership. See Black's Law Dictionary 1095 (5th ed. 1979); R. Brown, supra note
28, § 1.5, at 6. Thus, whether the owner of a copyright owns the copyrighted work is
essentially the same inquiry as whether the copyrighted work is the personal property
of the copyright owner.
69. See Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 290 (1982); United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344
U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952); United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1932);
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1931); Prussian v. United States, 282
U.S. 675, 677 (1931); 3 C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59.03 (4th ed.
1974). As a felony provision with harsh penalties, see 18 U.S.C § 2314 (1982)
(maximum penalty of ten years in prison and a $10,000 fine), the NSPA warrants
very narrow interpretation. See 3 C. Sands, supra, § 59.03, at 7-8.
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prescribe punishment for, criminal conduct.70 Admittedly, broad in-
terpretation of the NSPA to include copyright infringement would not
define as illegal what Congress has not already designated as such.
Such interpretation, however, renders the copyright infringer suscep-
tible to penalties far greater than those Congress articulated. 71 A
broad judicial interpretation of the NSPA, therefore, substantially
encroaches upon Congress' penalty-prescribing prerogative. Further-
more, due process demands that statutes provide unequivocal notice
not only of what conduct is illegal, but also of what punishment such
illegality elicits. 72 Therefore, even though the copyright infringer
knowingly commits a crime, it is unfair to subject him to penalties
that are either devoid of congressional approval or beyond the scope of
statutory notice.
Strict construction does not require the narrowest construction that
a statute's language permits.73 Moreover, "general language should
not be restricted by the courts to the particularized application which
motivated its adoption. '7 4 Thus, the fact that Congress may not have
envisioned interstate transportation of intangible, stolen property as a
*serious criminal problem when the NSPA was enacted should not
necessarily exclude intangibles from the NSPA's current embrace. The
law should retain the flexibility necessary to deal with criminals who
invent new ways of committing crimes. 75
70. See Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620, 628 (1926); Krichman v. United
States, 256 U.S. 363, 367-68 (1921); Merrill v. United States, 338 F.2d 763, 770 (5th
Cir. 1964); 3 C. Sands, supra note 69, § 59.03, at 8.
71. The maximum penalty for criminal copyright infringement is five years in
prison and a $250,000 fine. See supra note 6. The NSPA, on the other hand, provides
a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $10,000 fine. See supra note 69. Thus,
conviction under both the copyright laws and the NSPA could result in a 15 year
prison sentence and a $260,000 fine. Furthermore, conviction under the NSPA is a
predicate offense to conviction under the Racketeer Influenced a Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO) provisions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982), see id. § 1961; United
States v. Gottesman, No. 81-5663, slip op. at 1639-40 (11th Cir. Feb. 16, 1984);
United States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 380, 391 (E.D.N.Y.), motion for
new trial granted, 518 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dismissed, 675 F.2d
17 (2d Cir. 1982), which prescribe a maximum prison sentence of 20 years, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963 (1982).
72. W. Lafave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 11, at 83-84 (1972); see United States
v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 494 (1948); 3
C. Sands, supra note 69, § 59.03, at 7.
73. United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1955); Singer v. United
States, 323 U.S. 338, 341-42 (1945); United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 552
(1938); Belarde v. Municipality of Anchorage, 634 P.2d 567, 568 (Alaska 1981); 3 C.
Sands, supra note 69, § 59.06, at 18-19.
74. Bostick v. Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp., 260 F.2d 534, 539 (4th Cir. 1958);
see 3 C. Sands, supra note 69, § 59.06, at 18.
75. United States v. Belmont, 715 F.2d 459, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1275 (1984), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Hampshire v. United States,
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Copyright infringement, however, is not a new means of stealing
property. Indeed, it is a distinct offense that long preceded enactment
of the NSPA. 76 The NSPA' coverage of copyright infringement does
not represent a rational development of the law to accommodate
modern criminal methods. Rather, it represents an attempt by prose-
cutors to increase penalties without congressional approval.
II. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE NSPA AND THE CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT
LAWS
The legislative histories of both the NSPA and the criminal copy-
right laws support the theory that copyright infringement is not a
form of theft under the NSPA. The NSPA's primary purpose is to
prevent criminals from exploiting the territorial limitations on state
law enforcement. 77 Thus, the NSPA's drafters contemplated coverage
of crimes that were violations of existing state law.78 Copyright in-
fringement, at the time the NSPA was enacted, was almost exclusively
a federal offense. 79 Furthermore, the legislative history indicates that
the type of state crimes contemplated by the NSPA's drafters were
traditional tangible-property offenses. 80 Not surprisingly, therefore,
the NSPA's legislative history contains no mention of copyright in-
fringement. 8 '
52 U.S.L.W. 3704 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1984) (No. 83-1445); see United States v. Dege, 364
U.S. 51, 52 (1960) (criminal statutes should not "be construed by some artificial and
conventional rule") (quoting United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 55
(1909)).
76. The Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, which contained criminal
copyright provisions, see id. 25, 35 Stat. 1081-82, was passed 25 years prior to
enactment of the NSPA. See Act of May 22, 1934, ch. 333, 48 Stat. 794 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982)).
77. H.R. Rep. No. 2528, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1929); 78 Cong. Rec. 2947
(1934) (remarks of Sen. Ashurst, quoting letter from Homer Cummings, Att'y Gen.);
accord United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379, 384 (1946); United States v. Smith,
686 F.2d 234, 245 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 994 (5th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Gallant, 570 F. Supp. 303, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
78. United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379, 384 (1946); United States v. Smith,
686 F.2d 234, 245 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 994 (5th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Gallant, 570 F. Supp. 303, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
79. State copyright protection, since passage of the Copyright Act of 1909, has
applied only to unpublished works. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
80. United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1982). The NSPA was
introduced as an "anti-gangster" measure intended to suppress "particularly the more
violent crimes of violence." 78 Cong. Rec. 2946-47 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Ashurst,
quoting letter from Homer Cummings, Att'y Gen.). Therefore, Congress, when it
enacted the NSPA, was aiming at the kind of property "normally the subject of theft
by gangsters." In re Vericker, 446 F.2d 244, 248 (2d Cir. 1971).
81. United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 246 (5th Cir. 1982); see United States
v. Gallant, 570 F. Supp. 303, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Congress has not explicitly
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The PCAA, on the other hand, is expressly designed to combat
copyright infringement. 2 Admittedly, the PCAA provides that crimi-
nal copyright penalties are not necessarily the exclusive criminal pen-
alties for piracy,8 3 and this provision has been used as a basis for
holding that the NSPA applies to copyright infringement. 84 Clearly, a
single criminal act can give rise to indictments under several federal
statutes as long as the statutes require proof of different facts. s5 The
NSPA and the PCAA indisputably require different standards of
proof. Any willful copyright infringement for profit, by definition,
violates the PCAA.8s The NSPA, however, requires that the stolen
goods be worth at least $5000 and be transported across state lines.8 7
At first impression, therefore, the NSPA could be read to apply to a
limited category of copyright infringement.
indicated whether the NSPA covers copyright infringement). The NSPA was enacted
in 1934, Act of May 22, 1934, ch. 333, 48 Stat. 794. The legislative history of this
enactment reveals no congressional intention to include copyrights within the scope
of goods whose theft is subject to the NSPA. See H.R. Rep. No. 1599, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934) (Conference Committee Report); S. Rep. No. 538, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934); H.R. Rep. No. 1462, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The law was codified with
minor amendments in 1939, Act of Aug. 3, 1939, ch. 413, 53 Stat. 1178, and has been
amended four times since then. See Act of Sept. 28, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-535, 82
Stat. 885; Act of Oct. 4, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-371, 75 Stat. 802; Act of July 9, 1956,
ch. 519, 70 Stat. 507; Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, 63 Stat. 89. None of these
amendments relate to copyrights or any other intangible property. See H.R. Rep. No.
1728, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968) (traveler's checks bearing forged countersigna-
tures), reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3654, 3654; S. Rep. No. 1086,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961) (fraudulent state tax stamps), reprinted in 1961 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3264, 3264; H.R. Rep. No. 2474, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3
(1956) (confidence game swindles), reprinted in 1956 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
3036, 3036-38; S. Rep. No. 303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1949) (minor language
changes), reprinted in 1949 U.S Code Cong. & Ad. News 1248, 1248.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(a) (1982).
83. See id § 2319(a) ("and such penalties shall be in addition to any other
provisions of title 17 or any other law").
84. See United States v. Gottesman, No. 81-5663, slip op. at 1639 (11th Cir. Feb.
16, 1984); United States v. Belmont, 715 F.2d 459, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1275 (1984), petition for cert. filed sub noma. Hampshire v. United
States, 52 U.S.L.W. 3704 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1984) (No. 83-1445).
85. See lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975); Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338,
342-43 (1911); United States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 380, 386 (E.D.N.Y.),
motion for new trial granted, 518 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dismissed,
675 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1982).
86. Criminal copyright infringement encompasses any willful infringement of a
copyright "for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain." 17
U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982). The PCAA prescribes penalties for criminal copyright in-
fringement. 18 U.S.C. § 2318(a) (1982).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982).
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A closer examination of the legislative history of the criminal copy-
right laws, however, suggests that the NSPA was not intended to
apply to copyright infringement. The legislative histories of both the
1976 Act 88 and the PCAA 89 include no reference to the NSPA. This
omission is significant because the NSPA prescribes a maximum prison
term twice as long as that provided by the PCAA. Furthermore,
conviction under the NSPA, unlike a conviction under the copyright
laws, is a predicate offense to conviction under the Racketeer Influ-
ence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).90 Thus, joint coverage
of copyright infringement by the NSPA and the copyright laws creates
a potential deterrent that dwarfs the deterrent represented by the
latter alone. This potential deterrent would have been worthy of
mention by legislators whose aim was "to develop a deterrent that
pirates ... cannot ignore." 91 Therefore, Congress' failure to mention
the NSPA in enacting the criminal copyright laws strongly suggests
that Congress did not think the NSPA covered criminal copyright
infringement. 92
88. United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 247 (5th Cir. 1982); see United States
v. Gallant, 570 F. Supp. 303, 313-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Congress did not indicate, in
its enactment of the 1976 Act, whether the NSPA covers transportation of copyright-
infringing goods.); H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161-64 (1976) (no
mention of the NSPA in section on remedies for copyright infringement), reprinted in
1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659, 5777-80; id. at 180 (no mention of the
NSPA in section on amendments to other statutes), reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 5796; S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 143-46 (1975) (no
mention of the NSPA in section on remedies for copyright infringement); id. at 159
(no mention of the NSPA in section on amendments to other statutes).
89. See United States v. Gallant, 570 F.Supp. 303, 313-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(Congress failed to indicate, in its enactment of the PCAA, whether the NSPA covers
transportation of copyright-infringing goods.); H.R. Rep. No. 495, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1982) (no mention of the NSPA in section on criminal penalties for copyright
infringement) [hereinafter cited as the 1982 House Report]; 1981 Senate Report,
supra note 1, at 3 (no mention of the NSPA in section on relationship of PCAA to
other statutes), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 127.
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982). See supra note 71.
91. 1982 House Report, supra note 89, at 3; 1981 Senate Report, supra note 1, at
6-7, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 132-33.
92. The legislative discussion regarding passage of the PCAA focused on the
interplay between the lack of a meaningful penalty for criminal copyright infringe-
ment and the increasing involvement of organized crime in the perpetration of that
offense. See 1982 House Report, supra note 89, at 3; 1981 Senate Report, supra note
1, at 6-7, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 132-33. The NSPA
provides a prison sentence twice as long as the maximum sentence prescribed by the
PCAA's penalty provisions. See supra notes 6, 69. Moreover, RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (1982), which provides a maximum prison sentence four times as long as
that of the PCAA's, id. § 1963 (twenty years), is specifically designed to combat
organized crime. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose
(1982); see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 (1981).
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Moreover, had Congress contemplated the NSPA's coverage of
copyright infringement, it is difficult to understand why Congress
would have amended the 1976 Act in 1982 to provide stiffer penalties
for infringement. The narrow range of offenses that do not meet the
NSPA's valuation and travel requirements hardly seems significant
enough to warrant a major amendment to the copyright laws. 93 In
addition, there is no indication in the legislative history of either the
PCAA or the 1976 Act that Congress intended to punish interstate
piracy more severely than its intrastate equivalent. 94 Application of
the NSPA to criminal copyright infringement, however, could have
this effect. For example, a criminal convicted of intrastate piracy
faces a maximum of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine. 95 A
person convicted of interstate piracy of the same material, on the
other hand, who is also prosecuted under the NSPA and RICO, could
be sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.96 The legislative history of
the criminal copyright laws indicates that Congress never contem-
plated this result.97 Thus, the interplay between the NSPA and the
criminal copyright laws demonstrates that the NSPA should not apply
to copyright infringement.
CONCLUSION
Statutory copyright is theoretically and functionally distinct from
ownership of the copyrighted material. The constitutional policy un-
93. See United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 249 (5th Cir. 1982) (PCAA would
have been unnecessary if the NSPA, with its harsh penalties, were available). The
NSPA applies when stolen goods worth $5000 or more are transported interstate. See
18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982). The PCAA's maximum penalties apply when a criminal
copyright infringement involves 1000 or more infringing copies of a sound recording
or 65 or more infringing copies of an audiovisual work. Id. § 2319(b) (1). Thus, unless
his pirated tapes are worth less than $5.00 each, or his pirated films are worth less
than $76.94 each, an infringer who possesses the minimum number of copies neces-
sary to trigger the PCAA's maximum penalty also satisfies the NSPA's valuation
requirement. Assuming his activities are interstate in nature, therefore, an infringer
who can be punished under the harshest PCAA provisions can often be punished even
more severely under the NSPA, if that statute applies to copyright infringement,
94. United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 246 & n.21 (5th Cir. 1982). Congress
did not need to use the commerce clause to gain jurisdiction over activities involving
copyrights. Id.; see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Therefore, it had no reason to
distinguish between intrastate and interstate copyright infringement.
Admittedly, Congress would have a rational basis for considering interstate in-
fringement more dangerous than its intrastate equivalent if the former were shown to
involve, on the average, larger criminal operations. Congress, however, has already
addressed the issue of magnitude by basing the severity of copyright penalties on the
number of infringing copies involved. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b) (1982).
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1).
96. See supra notes 69, 71.
97. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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derlying copyright subordinates the author's right to profit from his
labor to the public interest in promoting the arts and sciences. Con-
sistent with this constitutional policy, statutory copyright provides
limited public access to the copyrighted material and thus deprives the
copyright owner of the right of exclusion that characterizes property
ownership.
The NSPA, according to its language and legislative history, is
aimed only at crimes that violate rights associated with property
ownership; therefore, it does not apply to copyright infringement.
Instead, copyright infringement is expressly prohibited by the crimi-
nal copyright laws, which were recently amended to increase the
deterrent against such infringement. These amendments reflect a con-
gressional belief that the NSPA does not apply to copyright infringe-
ment and a congressional intention to punish copyright infringers
without regard to whether their activities are intrastate or interstate
in nature. Because the NSPA applies only to interstate criminal activi-
ties, it is clearly not intended to cover copyright infringement. In the
absence of such congressional intent, courts should not mislabel the
copyright infringer as a thief.
Conrad Jordan
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